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THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION BAN ON
TELEVISION ADVERTISING TARGETING
CHILDREN: WOULD IT VIOLATE EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
Swedish law bans all television advertising that specifically targets
children under the age of twelve. This prohibition, the most extensive of its
kind in Europe, affects not only toy advertisements, but covers advertising for
sweets and fast foods as well.2 Sweden has clearly stated its intention, upon
assuming presidency of the European Union ("EU") in January 2001, to press
for an expansion of their domestic ban to all of the EU's fifteen member
3states.
European toy marketers and broadcasters are strongly opposed to any
such extension and intend to contest it on all possible fronts.4 One possible
legal challenge would contend that the ban violates certain provisions
governing freedom of expression5 outlined by the European Convention on
Human Rights("Convention").6 This note evaluates the prospects of such a
1. SWEDISH BROADCASTING LAW art. 11, Sec. 4 (Radiolag 1966:755). The statute reads:
"Commercial Advertisements in a television transmission may not have the purpose of
attracting the attention of children under the age of twelve." Id.
2. See Industry Divided Over Prospect of Ban on Children's Advertising, MARKETING
WEEK, July 8, 1999, at 17 ("Industry Divided").
3. See Harriet Green, Children's Ad's Under Threat ofEUBan, CAMPAIGN, May 7, 1999.
4. See Jonathan Annells, Euro Group Battles Kids Ad Ban, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June
9, 1999, at 6.
5. See, e.g., Axel Edling, Address at conference in London regarding TV Advertising and
Children (Nov. 23, 1999), available at <http://lists.essential.org/commercial-
alert/msgOO028.html>. Edling, Sweden's Consumer Ombudsman, is responsible for
overseeing the administration of Sweden's advertising regulations.
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222 (Convention). A declaration of the Council of Europe, the
Convention was signed in Rome on Nov. 4, 1950, and came into effect on September 3rd,
1954. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
challenge, and concludes that it would fail. Under the Convention, State
interference with free expression is permissible when a State acts in the
interest of protecting public morals.7 Because an EU-wide ban on television
advertising directed at children would advance the EU Member States'
interest in protecting children's morals 8 it would not violate the Convention.
Part II of this note determines the likely structure of the proposed EU-
wide ban on children's advertising on television, and will also briefly review
the social arguments for and against a ban. Part III of this note provides a
brief overview of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the
jurisdiction and authority of The European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR"), the Court that would ultimately adjudicate any Convention-based
challenge to the ban. Part IV examines Article 10 of the Convention, which
promulgates the rights of free expression. This section analyzes the case law
surrounding commercial speech under Article 10, and specifically examines
the three-part test the ECHR has developed for ascertaining violations of
Article 10. This note applies the three-part test, and determines that the
ECHR would be unlikely to find that a ban on all television advertising
targeting children would violate the Convention.
II. THE PROPOSED BAN
A. Sweden's Domestic Ban
Sweden's broadcasting law bans all television advertising targeting
children under the age of twelve.9 It is important to note that this ban
specifically regulates the content and structure of television advertisements,
not simply what can and cannot be advertised."0 Toy advertisements, for
example, may be aired only if they are designed to attract and inform adults
rather than children.11 This distinction between target and content allows
marketers of commodities typically consumed by children to maintain an
advertising presence on television, as long as they attempt to market only to
teenagers or adults.12 Conversely, advertisements for commodities that
appeal to children as well as adults, such as fast food and candy, must be
7. See Convention, supra note 5, Art. 10.
8. See Edling, supra note 6.
9. See SWEDISH BROADCASTING LAW, supra note 1.
10. See id.; see also Industry Divided, supra note 2.
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designed with great care as they cannot appear to appeal directly to children
under twelve years old. 3
Similar but less severe bans on children's advertising currently exist
in several other EU nations.14 Generally, the bans regulate the scheduling
and placement of advertising, but not specific content. 5 Only Norway
maintains a ban that is as strict as Sweden's.' 6 Still other EU nations prefer
a self-regulatory approach, leaving it up to the broadcasting and advertising
industries to define its own standards.17
13. See Industry Divided, supra note 2. Television advertisements for McDonald's in
Sweden cannot incorporate any images of the clown Ronald McDonald. Id.
14. See Green, supra note 3. In the Flemish region of Belgium, advertising is prohibited
from five minutes before to five minutes after all children's programming. Denmark, Poland,
and Ireland all have domestic legislation regulating content and scheduling of children's
advertising. Id.
Greece maintains a ban on all toy advertising on TV, although many contend that
this ban is more a commercial measure designed to protect domestic toy makers than an effort
to protect children. In August of 1999, the European Commission declined to investigate a
claim brought by the European toy industry in 1994 alleging that Greece's ban violated EU
single market rules. The EC's refusal to investigate has fueled fears that an EU-wide ban is
not far off. Darran Gardner, Toy Makers Vow to Fight ifEU Bans Advertising, THE SUNDAY
HERALD (GLASGOW), August 22, 1999, at 6.
15. See Green, supra note 3.
16. ACT No. 127 OF 4 DECEMBER 1992 RELATING TO BROADCASTING, Sec. 3- 1 (Norway).
The Act states: "Advertisements may not be broadcast in connection with children's
programs, nor may advertisements specifically target children." This ban, like Sweden's, is
content based. Id.
17. See Tomkins, supra note 11. Advertisers in the UK operate under a self-imposed code
of conduct. Id.
50320001
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B. The Television Without Frontiers Directive
There is no EU law that directly governs advertising."8 Instead, An
EU directive, The Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF),1 9 sets
television content and scheduling criteria that each EU Member State must
comply with.2° Member States adhere to the directive through passage of
local legislation. 21 An extension of the Swedes' domestic ban would entail
18. See Thomas W. Reader, Comment, Is Self-Regulation the Best Option for the
Advertising Industry in the European Union? An Argument for the Harmonization of
Advertising Laws Through the Continued Use of Directives, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 181
(1995).
19. Council Directive 97/36/EC, amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC, 30 June 1997
"Television Without Frontiers" (TVWF), 1997 O.J. (L 202); 1998 O.J. (L).
20. Seeid. The TVWF Directive primarily covers the transmission oftelevision broadcasts
between EU member states. Art. 2, Chapter II sets the basic rule that broadcasters are only
required to comply with the broadcasting laws of the Member State from where the
transmission originates, and are not required to adhere to the laws of nations where their
transmissions may be received. The operation of this directive is illustrated in the recent De
Agostini case. Joined Cases 34/35 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini
(Svenska). Case C-34/35 Forlag AB and Case 35/95 and Case 36/95 TV-Shop i Sverige AB,
1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7506, (1997). In De Agostini, the European Court of Justice ruled
that because TVWF Directive supercedes local broadcasting laws, toy advertisements
broadcast from the UK into Sweden were not subject to Sweden's domestic ban on children's
advertising. The De Agostini decision has undoubtedly been a motivating factor in their
desire to extend their domestic ban to the entire EU. See Annells, supra note 4.
21. Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community, Art. 189 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. "A Directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods." Id.
Member States must enact some form of legislation to comply with the Directive,
unless sufficient legislation already exists. Informal national commitments to uphold a
Directive's standards, through common law or otherwise, are not sufficient. See John Usher,
The Legal Framework of the European Union, THE EUROPEAN UNION ENCYCLOPEDIA AND
DIRECTORY, (Europa Publications Ltd. 1999).
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an amendment to the TVWF,22 which would in turn require each Member
State to modify their National broadcasting laws accordingly.23
The existing TVWF advertising restrictions reflect two main
concerns. The Directive contains provisions aimed at overall consumer
protection and also attempts to minimize children's exposure to misleading
or morally corrupting advertising.24 The TVWF addresses these concerns by
mandating that advertising must clearly be distinguishable from
programming, and by limiting the ratio of advertising time to programming
time.25 Further guidelines regulate the nature and content of advertisements,
dictating they cannot be offensive to human dignity or religious or political
beliefs, that they cannot reflect race, gender, or nationality based
discrimination, and that they cannot encourage dangerous behavior.26 These
purposely equivocal guidelines reflect the EU's awareness of inconsistencies
in both the regulatory and moral standards among the various EU Member
States, and provide Member States with standards that can be interpreted and
applied in a manner consistent with public sentiments.27
22. See generally D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (Butterworths 1995). The general EU legislative procedure involves the European
Commission making a proposal to the European Council, which in turn may pass legislation
on it. In various circumstances, the Council may be required to obtain an opinion from either
the European Parliament or the Economic and Social Committee. Id.
23. See id.
24. See TVWF, supra note 19, Chapter IV, "Television Advertising, Sponsorship, and
Teleshopping". Art. 10 introduces the chapter and provides a summary of the Chapter's
concerns: "(1) Television advertising and teleshopping shall be readily recognizable as such
and kept quire separate from other parts of the programme service by optical and/or acoustic
means; (2) Isolated advertising and teleshopping spots shall remain the exception; (3)
Advertising and teleshopping shall not use subliminal techniques; and (4) Surreptitious
advertising and teleshopping shall be prohibited." Id.
25. See id. at Art. 11. "No advertisements may air during religious broadcasts, or during
any newscasts, current affairs, documentary, or children's programs when their scheduled
duration is less than 30 minutes." Id. at para. 5. For programs lasting more than thirty
minutes, the TVWF provides restrictive scheduling guidelines for advertising placement. Id.
para. 3 & 4.
26. See id. at Art. 12. "Television advertising shall not: (a) prejudice respect for human
dignity: (b) include any discrimination on grounds of race, sex or nationality; (c) be offensive
to religious of political beliefs; (d) encourage behavior prejudicial to health or safety; (e)
encourage behavior prejudicial to the protection of the environment." Id.
27. See Perry Keller, The New Television Without Frontiers Directive, in THE YEARBOOK
OF MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 1997/98 189 (Prof. Eric M. Barendt ed., 1997).
2000]
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There are three areas, however, in which the TVWF commands
stricter standards. These areas relate to television advertising for tobacco,
alcohol, and children's advertising.28 The TVWF prescribes an outright ban
on all tobacco advertising. 29 This ban is absolute, simply stated, and it
provides for no exceptions.3" Since its inception in the original TVWF
directive in 1989, it has not been legally challenged.31 Some television
advertising for alcoholic beverages is allowable under the TVWF, but it is
subject to restrictions that prohibit a broad range of possibly irresponsible
depictions and messages.32 One of these restrictions prevents alcohol
advertisements from specifically targeting minors, as well as from including
minors within the commercial.33
The TVWF attempts to protect children by stating generally that
"Television advertising shall not cause moral or physical detriment to
minors'"" and then supplying several criteria which children's advertising
must adhere to.35 These criteria consist of prohibitions against exploiting
28. See TVWF, supra note 19, arts. 13, 15, and 16.
29. See id. at Art. 13. "All forms of tobacco advertising for cigarettes and other tobacco
products shall be prohibited."
30. See id.
31. See J. Steven Rich, Note, Commercial Speech in the Law of the European Union:
Lessons for the United States?, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 263 (1998). The fact that no legal
challenge to the ban on tobacco advertising does not in itself suggest that the ban is legally
sound. The lack of any significant challenge is more likely due to the advertising and tobacco
industries recognition of overwhelming public support for the measure. It is quite likely that
if the ban was struck down, it simply would be replaced by voluntary measures. Prof. Rich
argues that the ban likely violates the European Convention on Human Rights dictates
protecting free commercial speech. Id. at 270.
32. See TVWF, supra note 19, Art. 15. "Television advertising and teleshopping for
alcoholic beverages shall comply with the following criteria: (a) it may not be aimed
specifically at minors or, in particular, depict minors consuming these beverages; (b) it shall
not link the consumption of alcohol to enhanced physical performance or driving; (c) it shall
not create the impression that the consumption of alcohol contributes towards social or sexual
success; (d) it shall not claim that alcohol has therapeutic qualities of that it is a stimulant, a
sedative, or a means of resolving personal conflicts; (e) it shall not encourage immoderate
consumption of alcohol or present abstinence or moderation in a negative light; (f) it shall not
place emphasis on high alcoholic content as being a positive quality of the beverages." Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at Art. 16.
35. See id. The full text of Art, 16 reads: "Paragraph 1: Television advertising shall not
cause moral or physical detriment to minors, and shall therefore comply with the following
criteria for their protection: (a) it shall not directly exhort minors to by a product or a service
[Vol. 20
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children's naivete or capitalizing upon their trust in adults, against coercing
children to pester their parents into purchases, and against depicting minors
in "unreasonably" dangerous situations.36
Structurally, Sweden's ban on children's advertising more closely
resembles the TVWF's absolute ban on tobacco advertising than it does the
collection of standards provided for the protection of children.37  The
Swedish ban is unequivocally stated, and excepts no circumstances in which
advertising targeting children under twelve would be permissible. 38 For the
purposes of this note, we will assume that should the Swedes be successful
in their endeavor to extend their domestic ban, the subsequent amendment
to the TVWF would be similarly absolute, and would mirror the structure of
the current TVWF ban on tobacco advertising.39
C. Social Arguments For and Against a Ban
Public debate over the necessity of an EU-wide ban on children's
advertising has been largely carried out between an alliance of various
advertising and broadcast industry groups ("advertising industry")4" and a
collection of unallied advocates for a ban which include consumer advocate
organizations, environmentalists, and various children's rights groups
by exploiting their experience or credulity; (b) it shall not directly encourage minors to
persuade their parents or others to purchase the goods or services being advertised; (c) it shall
not exploit the special trust minors place in parents, teachers or other persons; (d) it shall not
unreasonably show minors in dangerous situations. Paragraph 2: Teleshopping shall comply
with the requirements referred to in paragraph 1 and, in addition, shall not exhort minors to
contract for the sale or rental of goods and services." Id.
36. See id.
37. See SWEDISH BROADCASTING LAW, supra note 1.
38. See id.
39. It is very likely that a ban on children's advertising, if even passed by the European
Council, would not be as absolute as the tobacco ban. Rather, a reformulation of the current
language may result from a compromise on matter. See, e.g., Annells, supra note 4.
However, the various possible structures of a ban on children's advertising is beyond the
scope of this note, which only focuses on the Human Rights questions presented by the ban
in the form currently proposed by Sweden.
40. See James Geary, Childhood's End? TIME August 2, 1999. The European advertising
industry has pooled resources to create a lobbying group known as the "Children's
Programme" which produces research and commentary relating to the proposed ban. For the
purposes of this note, references to the "advertising industry" will implicitly include all
advertising and broadcasting industry groups opposed to the proposed ban. Id.
2000]
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("advocates"). 4' The EU has fueled the debate by publishing several follow-
ups 42 to the Green Paper on commercial communications of 1997, which
recognized some Member State's calls for stricter controls on children's
advertising.43 The EU called upon the advertising industry to participate in
the development of new methods of protecting minors from irresponsible
advertising, and to cooperate with both national and European authorities to
devise an EU-wide approach. 4
The advocates claim that children represent the advertisers' dream
target; naive consumers who are easily impressed and manipulated into
spending money.45 They support that argument with studies that suggest that
children have difficulty distinguishing between advertisements and actual
programming,46 and that children tend to trust advertising messages more
than adults do.47
Advocates of a ban also enjoy the implied endorsement of various
national legislatures who have already passed laws regulating children's
advertising.48 These laws are usually justified on two grounds, one moral and
the other more economic.49 The primary purpose often reflects belief that it
is simply unethical to entice young and naive children into the brutal world
of mass marketing and consumerism.5 ° A second purpose is rooted in the
desire of legislators, many of whom are parents themselves, to limit what
41. See Industry Divided, supra note 2. Friends of Earth, an environmental group argues
that any increase in consumerism worldwide inevitably leads to environmental damage. Food
Alliance, and Sustain, consumer watchdog groups argue that advertisements for foods high
in sugar, salt, and fat content undermine parents' efforts to encourage healthy diets. Id.
42. See Results of the Public Consultation on the Convergence Green Paper
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of Regions, COM 108 (1999).
43. See Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and
Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation, COM 97 623, (Dec.
03, 1997).
44. See Results, supra note 42.
45. See Edling, supra note 6.
46. See Lene Hansen, Television Advertising Directed at Children, (European Comm'n
Commercial Communications Newsletter), Oct., 1997.
47. See id.
48. See Allyson L. Stewart-Allen, Rules for Reaching Euro Kids are Changing,
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advocates call "pester power", which describes children's tendency to badger
parents into purchasing what they've just seen advertised on TV."
The advertising industry readily answers the advocates' arguments.
Despite its blunt and despairing assessment of modem culture, the
advertising industry argues that today's world is consumer driven, and
children ought to be indoctrinated into that reality at a young age. 2 This
implies that the advertising industry sees children's advertising not as
immoral, but in fact helpful to their development. Research suggests that
children as young as five easily distinguish advertising from actual programs,
and even at that age even start ignoring them." In regards to complaints
about pester power, advertisers respond that the phrase simply describes a
"1,000 year old problem" that cannot be attributed to the "fifty-year-old
invention of television."54
The advertising industry's most cogent argument against a ban
contends that it would have an intensely detrimental effect on the quality of
children's programming in Europe. 5 As broadcasting revenues from
children's advertising have skyrocketed in recent years, 6 a good portion of
the money generated has gone into funding a higher quantity and quality of
children's programming. 7 The advertising industry argues that the loss of
these revenues would force European broadcasters to rely heavily upon lower
quality imported television shows. 8
51. See Hansen, supra note 46.
52. See Tomkins, supra note 11.
53. See, e.g., Dr. Reinhold Berger, The Effects of Commercial Advertising on Children,
(European Commission Commercial Communications Newsletter) Jan., 1999. Although the
argument that children "ignore" television advertisements seems to undermine to advertisers'
inherent purposes, any such conclusion is false. Modem advertising revolves around the
concept of "branding" which, in simplified explanation, is the practice of making names and
images of products ("brands") instantly recognizable via saturation through media exposure.
Id.
54. See Selling to a Captivated Market, FIN. TIMES (LONDON) (April 23, 1999) at 10.
55. See Annells, supra note 4.
56. See id. According to the European Group for Television Advertising, a trade group
representing broadcasters, in 1998 95% of the annual $248.6 million earned by its members
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III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Convention
The European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) 9 is
widely regarded as the modem world's most successful system of
international law for the protection of human rights.60 The Convention and
its subsequent amendments comprise fifty-nine articles61 enumerating certain
fundamental civil rights62 and the mechanics of the Convention's
application.63 All EU Member States are signatories to the convention.64
The EU itself is not a signer to the Convention and therefore not
directly bound by its dictates. 65 The Convention does, however, control
aspects of EU law in that it has been incorporated into Union law via the
Maastrict Treaty.66 The Convention is often referred to in decisions of the
European Court of Justice, the EU's supreme judicial body.67 The lack of
formal accession to the Convention by the EU means that neither an
individual nor signatory State can directly challenge an EU law or provision
59. See Convention, supra note 5.
60. See Hon. John P. Flaherty, Maureen E. Lally-Green, Fundamental Rights in the
European Union, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 249, 276 (1998).
61. See Convention, supra note 5.
62. See id. These listed rights include: the "right to live"; the right to be "free from torture
or degrading punishment"; the prohibition of slavery and compulsory labor; the right to
"liberty and security of person"; the right to a fair trial and a presumption of innocence;
protection from ex post facto laws; the right to respect for "private and family
life.. home.. .and correspondence"; the right to freedom of "thought, conscience, and
religion"; freedom of expression; freedom of peaceful assembly; the right to marry and found
a family; a right of remedy and protection from discrimination against anyone based upon
race, religion, nationality, birth, sex, and political orientation. Id.
63. See id.
64. See Flaherty, supra note 61. With the exception of Great Britain, Ireland, and
Denmark, all EU member states have incorporated the Convention into their domestic law.
Id.
65. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 27.
66. Treaty on European Union, FEB. 7, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, ART. F (Treaty of Maastrict).
The Maastrict treaty states: "Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention.. .as general principals of law." Id.
67. Benjamin L. Apt, On the Right to Free Expression in the European Union, 4 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 69, (1998).
[Vol. 20
EUROPEAN UNION ADVERTISING BAN
through the Convention's enforcement mechanisms.68 In order to contest an
EU Directive via the Convention, the challenge must be brought against an
EU Member State's domestic law that has been passed in accordance with
an EU Directive.69
B. The European Court of Human Rights
The Convention provides for both a European Commission on
Human Rights ° ("Commission") and The European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR").71 The Commission's role is to receive petitions against signatory
States and attempt to settle the matter if possible. 2 Failing resolution of the
dispute, the matter may be referred on to the ECHR, which is located in
Strasbourg, France.73 The ECHR is the supreme judicial body for
determining violations of the Convention.74 Its jurisdiction extends to "all
cases concerning the interpretation and application" of the Convention.75 All
EU Member States, as signatories the Convention,76 are bound by decisions
of the ECHR.77
It should be noted that the ECHR does not operate under the principal
of stare decisis,78 but instead follows the European continental custom of
only deciding the case presented.79 However, in practice the ECHR tends to
follow prior decisions, and routinely refers to them its opinions.80 It is
therefore not difficult for Member States to ascertain the state of human
68. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 27.
69. See id.
70. See Convention, supra note 5, Arts. 19-37.
71. See id. at Arts. 38-56.
72. See id.
73. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 27.
74. See ANDREW DRZEMCZEWISKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC
LAW 84 (1983).
75. See Convention, supra note 5, Art. 32.
76. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 27. All EU member states have bound themselves to the
Convention twice-once as individual signatories, and once as signatories to the Maastrict
treaty. Id.
77. See id.
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rights law under the Convention, nor is it difficult to analyze the case law
with a reasonable degree of predictability.8"
Before reaching the ECHR, all cases must first be considered by the
Commission.8 2 Any individual, group of individuals, or non-governmental
organization may file a petition with the Commission against a signatory
state provided that the concerned state "recognizes the competence of the
Commission to receive such petitions." 83 Although the Commission is not
required to accept the petition,84 if it does, it will attempt to reach a
settlement that is acceptable to all parties.85 If no such agreement can be
brokered, the Commission prepares a report stating its opinion on whether or
not there has been a violation of the Convention.86 The Commission's report
is not legally binding on the parties.
87
A case may reach the ECHR only after the Commission completes
its report, either by referral from the Commission itself, or by petition from
party with a recognized interest in the matter.88 Final legal resolution of the
conflict can come only in the form of a judgement of the ECHR, or from the
Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe.89 ECHR decisions are final
and are binding on the signatory states.90
81. See id.
82. See Flaherty, supra note 61, at 278.
83. See Convention, supra note 5, Art. 34.
84. See Flaherty, supra note 61, at 279. The Commission will reject anonymous petitions,
petitions that are "substantially the same" as ones examined before, and frivolous petitions.
Important to note is that the Commission will reject a petition if it finds that not all domestic
remedies have been exhausted. Id.
85. See id. If a "friendly settlement" is achieved, the commission will prepare a report
detailing the settlement for publication.
86. See Convention, supra note 5, Art. 31; see also HARRIS, supra note 22, at 5.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. Although final legal resolution can come in the form of an opinion by the
Committee of Ministers as well as an ECHR opinion, that particular body's processes for
determining Convention issues is beyond the scope of this article.
90. See id.
[Vol. 20
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IV. ARTICLE 10
A. Structure and Scope
Article 10 of the Convention decrees individual rights of freedom of
expression. 9' The Article, structured in two sections, extends to protect
virtually all forms of expression, 92 and then enumerates several
circumstances in which a state may legitimately interfere with free
expression. 93  One of these legitimate purposes under which a state
permissibly may restrict free expression arises when a State acts in the
interest of protecting public morals.94 Thus, protecting the morals of
children, provides the most justifiable grounds within the Convention for ban
on children's advertising.95
91. See CONVENTION, supra note 5, Art. 10. Article 10 reads: 1. Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity, of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary. Id.
92. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 375.
93. See id. The two-part structure of Article 10 helps illustrate the difference between the
Convention's treatment of free speech and that of the United States Constitution. The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution places great emphasis on what forms of
expression fall within its shield, and provides absolute protection to those that do. Id. Unlike
the First Amendment, Article 10 protection extends to ALL forms of expression, and
emphasis shifts to the justification of any interference, based upon Article 10(2). Id.
94. See Jacubowski v. Germany, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); see also Markt intern
and Beerman v. Germany, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
95. States have often cited the protection of morals as the primary purpose when children
are involved. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1 976)(British
authorities confiscate book marketed to adolescents containing sexual advice); see also,
Muller and Others v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (Swiss authorities ban
specific artwork containing depictions of homosexuality and bestiality from public display.)
Restrictions on advertising often are justified as actions intending to "protect the
rights of others." See Cosado Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); see also
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Broadcast advertising clearly falls within the scope of Article 10.
Advertising is a form of commercial expression,96 one of the three categories
of protected expression that the ECHR has identified.97 Not only is a
particular instance of expression itself protected, but the means of
transmitting that expression are as well.98 Thus, in the case of televised
advertising, not only is the commercial itself protected, but also the right to
transmit the commercial over the airwaves. 99
B. Case Law
While there is a considerable amount of Article 10 case law regarding
commercial expression, there have been no cases implicating restrictions on
large-scale advertising before the ECHR. 00 Of the relatively few advertising
cases that the ECHR has decided, none concern advertising specifically
targeting children or any other particular group of consumers.101 Certainly,
there have been no cases regarding restrictions upon advertising that come
near to approaching the scale of an EU-wide ban. The collection of
commercial speech cases comprising the case-law tend to concern either very
localized forms of advertising, such as newspaper ads publicizing a
professional's practice," 2 or editorial commentary in newsletters or trade
magazines that were held by National Courts as violating local anti-
Barthold v. F.R.G., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985). However, in nearly all cases the "rights"
of others that States seek to protect are those of members of certain professional classes who
feel that advertising sullies the reputation of their respective professions.
96. See Jacubowski 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (defining Commercial Expression as:
"Expression that is directed to furthering the economic interests of individuals and enterprises
[whether by advancing their own interests or undermining those of their rivals] through the
medium of expression, particularly advertising or other means of commercial information to
consumers.") Id.
97. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 22, at 377. The three types of expression are political
expression, artistic expression, and commercial expression. The distinctions between these
three categories is discussed infra.
98. See Autronic v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983) (holding that Article 10
extends to means of transmission and reception as well as content of expression.)
99. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 378.
100. See generally HARRIS, supra note 22.; see also Rich, supra note 31.
101. See id.
102. See Casado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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competition laws. °3 However, despite the lack of pure advertising cases,
Article 10 case law on commercial speech evinces a helpful consistency;
assessing the prospects of a challenge to a pan-European ban on children's
advertising is not a wholly unpredictable endeavor10°4
The ECHR routinely classifies all forms of expression into one of
three categories: political expression, artistic expression, or commercial
expression. 105 A hierarchy of value exists between the three categories, and
each group is afforded a different level of protection by the ECHR. 1 6
Commercial expression, less fundamental to the exchange of ideas within a
free and democratic society, is in the ECHR's view clearly secondary in
importance to political or artistic expression, and is provided with the lowest
level of protection.0 7 The effect of this diminished valuation is that State
restrictions on advertising are very rarely found to violate Article 10.108
The permissiveness of a State's interference with commercial speech
depends upon the particular circumstances surrounding the interference.10 9
Restrictions on free expression are allowed only when they are laid out in a
clearly appreciable law,"10 pursue a legitimate goal,"'1 and are necessary in
103. See Markt intern and Beerman v. Germany, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) (1989). Markt
intern concerned an injunction issued against a trade magazine from publishing an article that
raised doubts about the commercial reliability of an enterprise operating in the market sector
it reported on. The Court conceded that Markt intern itself was not a competitor in the
relevant market, but since it did intend to protect the interests of a group operating in that
sector, namely the retail purchasers of products, the ECHR determined that that editorial
commentary within the magazine was commercial expression; See also HARRIS, supra note
22, at 405. Markt intern is considered the leading case on commercial speech, and it is
notable for its almost complete deference to national decision (Germany) as well as for "the
brevity with which the applicant's arguments were treated." Id.
104. See Rich, supra note 31, at 260.





110. See HARRIS, supra note 22 at 386.
111. See id. at 391 .; see also Convention, supra note 5, Art. 10(2). A legitimate state goal
is any goal in accordance with any of the permissible grounds for interference with free
expression as listed in Article 10(2).
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a democratic society.'1 2 ECHRjurisprudence has molded these requirements
into a three-part test, which evaluates each one in strict order.
1 13
The first element of the test requires that any State interference with
free expression must come arise out of law.11 4 The law does not necessarily
have to be in the form of a statute.115 This requirement that an interference
be "prescribed by law" rarely poses a problem in Article 10 cases.
1 16
National laws clearly satisfy this requirement, as do codified regulations that
have been given effect of law by legislatures.1 7 The ECHR has very
willingly considered regulations imposed by local professional associations
upon their members, such as those imposed by bar councils,118 and chambers
of commerce, "' as "prescribed by law" when national legislatures have given
those codes effect of law.
The function of the "prescribed by law" requirement is to ensure that
all violations of laws abridging free expression are foreseeable by the
offender. 12' Absolute precision in the law is not required. 2' If the possibility
of being held in violation of a law is ascertainable through legal counsel, that
112. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 396.
113. See Casado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.; See also Open Door and Dublin Well Women
v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
114. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 389.
115. See Sunday Times v United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1979) (English
common law rule on contempt of court held to be prescribed by law).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Open Door, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 261. (Irish Constitutional prohibition on
distribution of information relating to abortion procedures held to be prescribed by law.); see
also Barthold v. F.R.G., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) (noting Hamburg veterinary
Surgeons' Council's competence to devise regulations in the sphere of professional conduct,
and also that German law gave such council's codes legal authority, the ECHR held that the
council's rules were prescribed by law). Id.
118. See Cosado Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). Mr. Cosado Coca argued
that the interference did not come from a 'public authority', rather, the Barcelona Bar
Council's written warning could be regarded as a reprimand by his peers. The Court rejected
this argument, finding that Spanish law on professional associations states that they are
public-law corporations, and therefore act with governmental authority. Id.
119. See Barthold, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R.
120. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 390.
121. See Market intern and Beerman v. Germany, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). With
regards to commercial speech, the Court has noted that absolute precision could not be
achieved in "spheres such as that of competition, in which the situation is constantly changing
in accordance with developments in the market and in the field of communication." Id.
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is enough to satisfy the requirement. 122 It is evident that the ECHR expects
those operating in the heavily regulated media environment to be properly
advised on legally controversial matters, and any claim that an interference
was not adequately "prescribed by law" will likely receive little attention. 1
23
The second element of the test considers the legitimacy of the
interference under the Convention. 24 This stage of the test does not attempt
to gauge the suitability of the law for obtaining its purpose, but rather if that
purpose itself corresponds with any of the several exceptions within Article
10 under which a State may abridge free expression. 125 If the purpose is
found to be within the specified exceptions, it is held to be legitimate.126
The ECHR allows a margin of appreciation to national
determinations of what is legitimate under the Convention, the breadth of
which depends upon the basis on which the State acts to restrict
expression. 127 When States legislate in the interest of protection of morals,
the ECHR gives the States extremely wide latitude in determining exactly
what morals are, and what is necessity to protect them.128 The Court has
repeatedly defended this wide margin of appreciation by pointing to the
difficulties and likely inequities of a supra-national body attempting to define
a universal set of values where "no pan-European consensus exists."'29 The
ECHR's continued reliance on this principal suggests that the ECHR would
be receptive to a pan-European consensus on what morals consist of, and
what is necessary to protect them, should the Court encounter consensus in
the form of an EU-wide directive.
The Court has been especially willing to defer to national
determinations on morality when the morality of children has been
122. See, e.g., Open Door and Dublin Well Women v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. Despite
textual ambiguity of the applicability of the Constitutional prohibition to the challengers, the
ECHR found that violation of the law was sufficiently foreseeable to the challengers. The
court specifically cited the fact that the challengers had obtained legal advice and had been
told that an injunction against their activities was likely.
123. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 390.
124. See id. at 391.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 392.
128. See Handyside v. UK, I Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 48. "State authorities are in principal
in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of
these requirements...." Id.
129. Handyside, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 48.
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concerned. 3°  However, this has usually arisen in situations where
governmental notions of obscenity were clearly in line with public sentiment,
such as when States have acted to protect children from exposure to obscene
materials."' To date, the ECHR has not encountered a case in which
government interference with free expression with the aim of protecting
children's morality has lacked overwhelming public support.1 32 However,
the ECHR's willingness to defer to national determinations on questions of
children and morality has been constant. 133 It is extremely doubtful that a
lack of extensive public support for particular piece of legislation would in
itself be enough to persuade the ECHR to abandon this course.
The conclusion that a particular aim is a legitimate one does not
immediately justify any interference. 134 The third and most critical element
of the three-part test requires the State to show that the interference is
"necessary in a democratic society."1 35 The necessity of a restriction depends
upon several factors. The value of the expression that is prohibited1 36 is taken
into consideration, as well as the audience the law seeks to protect.1 37 Other
relevant factors may be the suitability of the law for its purpose,"' the totality
of the interference,' 39 the availability of other less intrusive methods of
130. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 393.
131. See, e.g., Handyside, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. The Handyside case represented a challenge to
a British confiscation of a book ("The Little Red Schoolbook") which was intended for
distribution to adolescents between the age of twelve and eighteen. The book contained
several sexually informative passages, which British authorities argued "could be interpreted
as an encouragement to indulge in precocious activities harmful for them or even commit
certain criminal offenses." Id.; see also Muller and Others v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser A.) (1988), where Swiss authorities confiscated a painting depicting scenes of
homosexuality and bestiality. The painting was one ofthree exhibited in a public show where
a six year-old girl viewed it. Id.
132. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 22.
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Cosado Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Handyside, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
135. In Handyside, the Court expounded: "The Court notes...that, while the adjective
'necessary'...is not synonymous with 'indispensable', neither has it the flexibility of such
expression as 'admissible', 'ordinary', 'useful', 'reasonable' or 'desirable'." Handyside, I
Eur. Ct. H.R., at 48; see also HARRIS, supra note 22, at 396.
136. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 396.
137. See id. at 406.
138. See, e.g., Muller and Others v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 36.
139. See Cosado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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achieving the specified aim, 140 as well as the penalties for its violation.' 41 In
weighing these competing concerns the Court assesses the proportionality of
the law.142  Almost all Article 10 cases are decided on the basis of
proportionality. 43  Restrictions on free expression that are found
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued are upheld; those found
disproportionate are not.1
44
A margin of appreciation towards national decisions plays a key role
in assessing the proportionality of the interference. 45 However, the margin
offered by the Court when evaluating proportionality is significantly
narrower than the margin offered by the Court when considering the
legitimacy of the interference. 146 Seminal Article 10 cases set a high burden,
a "pressing social need," that States must show in order to be in accordance
with the Convention.1 47 However, this strict standard applies mainly to
restraints on political speech, 148 and the standard is considerably more
relaxed when a State regulates in the area of commercial speech. 14 Indeed,
ECHR decisions suggest that as long as a State's actions are a relevant
method of obtaining its legitimate aim, and the sanctions and effects of the
actions are not wholly disproportionate to that aim, the ECHR will not find
a violation of Article 10. 50
140. See Jacubowski, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R.
141. See Cosado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.
142. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 411.
143. See id.
144. See id.; see also Open Door and Dublin Well Women v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R.
145. See Harris, supra note 22, at 291.
146. See id. at 411. "In principal, the doctrine of a 'margin of appreciation'...is not a
doctrine of judicial deference to the national decision, for the Convention authorities carry
out their own fact-finding and apply the Convention law for themselves. Yet they have
declined the role of a fully-fledged appeal mechanism from the national decision. Instead,
the Court has said that the role of the Convention in protecting human rights is 'subsidiary'
to the roles of the national legal systems." Id.
147. See Sunday Times v. UK, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) at 65. The Court states that
freedom of expression is a principal "that is subject to a number of exceptions which must
be narrowly interpreted." Id.
148. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 402-403.
149. See id.
150. See Jacubowski v. Germany, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) at 26 (holding that in
cases of commercial speech the Court must "confine its review to the question whether the
measures taken at national level are justifiable in principal and proportionate."); see also
Cosado Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (holding that restrictions on lawyer's advertising
were allowable under Article 10 because they were reasonable method of protecting the rights
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For the ECHR the most relevant aspect in assessing the
proportionality of a restrictions on advertising has been the restriction's
totality. 15' The more difficult a restriction makes it for an advertiser to get
notice of their product to the public, the more strictly the court will examine
it."'52 Restrictions that amount to a complete barrier between the public and
a product are most likely to violate Article 10. 5' However, the existence of
almost any means of advertising that remains unprohibited renders a ban less
than complete and, therefore, acceptable.154
This principal is well illustrated by the ECHR's decision in Cosado
Coca v. Spain5 5 where the court upheld a Barcelona Bar Council's
prohibition on advertising by attorneys.156 A key factor in the decision was
the determination that the ban was not absolute. 57 The ECHR reached this
determination despite the fact that the exception in the Bar Council
regulation that permitted advertising was an extremely miserly one.'58 Under
the bar council rules, a lawyer could place a notice in a newspaper to
announce a brand new practice, or to announce the changing of the phone
number of an existing practice. 59 Despite this meager definition of what
constituted a less than total ban, the inference that any ban that was truly total
would violate the Convention is discernible. 6°
A restriction on commercial expression that fails to adequately
protect against the harm it was enacted to prevent may be disproportionate
of others, in this case the reputation of lawyers in general, and because violations of the ban
resulted in nominal penalties that were not disproportionate). Id.
151. See Rich, supra note 31, at 270.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.; see also, Cosado Coca v. Spain, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.




159. See Cosado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 52. "The Court notes that those rules
allowed advertising in certain cases.. .and under certain conditions. The ban therefore was not
an absolute one." The conditions in which advertising was allowed was set out in the
Barcelona Bar Council's decision on 'Members of the Bar and Advertising' for 24 February
198 1, section 2. Authorized Notices : "Members of the Bar may publish small notices in
local daily newspapers in order to announce the setting up of their practices or changes in
membership of address, telephone number, or telex number. The size and content of notices
must be approved in advance by the Bar Council. They may not appear more than three times
during a maximum period of two months." Id.
160. See Rich, supra note 31, at 273.
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as well. In Open Door Counseling and Dublin Well Women Center v.
Ireland,161 the ECHR found that an Irish law banning the dissemination by
women's health clinics of information pertaining to the availability of
abortions overseas was ineffective, and thereby disproportionate, because the
same information was legally available elsewhere in Ireland. 1
62
Although the ECHR's definition of what constituted advertising in
Open Door-the distribution of information relating to abortion and
reproductive health163-easily can be differentiated from traditional
advertising for profit, the case still demonstrates an important principle.
164
A ban on commercial expression may be held disproportionate when it is
ineffective. 165
The case law thus shows that State restrictions upon advertising for
commercial profit rarely, if ever, constitute violations of Article 10.166 In
determining such cases the ECHR gives a wide margin of appreciation to
national determinations on what constitutes a legitimate purpose under
Article 10.167 Whether a restriction is "necessary in a democratic society" is
a question of proportionality,168 and only those restrictions on commercial
expression found to be disproportionate violate Article 10.169 Cosado Coca
demonstrates that a ban on commercial advertising that is anything less than
total will not be found disproportionate. 171 Conversely, Open Door suggests
that a ban that is ineffective may restrict needlessly, and for that reason be
161. See Open Door and Dublin Well Women v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R.
162. See id. The Court also pointed out that despite the ban on providing information,
many Irish women had traveled overseas to obtain abortions during the time the regulation
was in effect. Id.
163. See id.
164. Open Door is a unique case, however, and its holding may be limited by its
surrounding circumstances. The underlying issues involved in the case-abortion and the
right of access to healthcare for women-may have resulted in a decision that was swayed,
impermissibly according to several strong dissents, by the Court's interjection of its own
notion of morals in evaluating the laws proportionality. See separate dissenting opinions by
Judge Cremora, Judge Matscher, and dissenting opinion of Judges Pettiti, Russo, and Lopes
Rocha. Open Door, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R.




169. See Casado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R (1994).
170. See id.
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disproportionate.' In the absence of such extremes, however, it appears that
national authorities have substantial leeway in regulating advertising. 17 2 The
ECHR's recent judgements confirm that States continue to enjoy a wide
margin of appreciation in devising constraints upon commercial expression
in ways that do not violate Article 10 of the Convention.173
C. Analysis Of The Proposed Ban
If called upon to determine the legitimacy under the Convention of
an EU-wide ban on children's advertising, it is likely that the only issue the
ECHR would examine with any precision would be the potential totality of
the ban. The legal argument with the greatest hope for success would
therefore be one that claimed that the ban amounts to an absolute barrier to
the effective marketing of certain items and services typically consumed by
children. A second argument urging a completely opposite estimation of the
ban's effect might claim that the ban does not completely prevent advertisers
from reaching children, and is therefore ineffective and disproportionate,
might, if well-crafted, gain the court's attention. Although both of these
arguments invoke questions of proportionality, an evaluation of the ban
would nevertheless be subject to the three-part test described above,174 and
we will consider each element in turn.
The proposed ban would clearly satisfy the first element, requiring
that it be "prescribed by law." Each EU-Member State would pass its own
laws in accordance with an amended TWVF Directive,'75 and each instance
of the ban would thereby emanate from a national governmental authority.
The laws, and the possibility and scope of sanctions, would be clearly
foreseeable to advertisers and broadcasters.' 76  In a market as highly
171. Open Door and Dublin Well Women v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also HARRIS,
supra note 22, at 413.
172. See Casado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Jacubowski v. Germany, 19 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
173. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 406.
174. See, e.g., Cosado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Jacubowski, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. The
Court's three-part analysis is invariable.
175. See Usher, supra note 21.
176. See, e.g., Annells, supra note 4; see also Green, supra note 3. The
comprehensiveness of the advertising industry's unified opposition to the ban suggests that
they are fully aware of the legal ramifications of a revised TVWF directive.
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regulated as the media industry, the ECHR would clearly expect broadcasters
to obtain legal advice on compliance.177
The second element of the test, assessing the legitimacy of the ban's
goal, similarly presents almost no window of opportunity for challenge. The
legitimate purpose of the ban under Article 10 would be grounded in Member
States' ability to regulate free expression where necessary to protect public
morals.'78 Whether or not broadcast advertising detrimentally affects
children's morals is a hotly contested issue.179 Credible evidence on both
sides of the issue has been advanced.180 However, the ECHR's wide margin
of appreciation for legislative determinations of what morality requires,
especially when concerning children, has been continuous, and it is highly
unlikely that the Court would commence to undermine national legislatures
now.18" ' This is especially so in the face of a pan-European determination on
what the protection of morals requires.182
Finally, the ECHR would address the question of whether the ban
would be "necessary in a democratic society," an examination of the ban's
proportionality.'83 Two possible avenues of arguing that the ban is
disproportionate, one asserting that it is total, and one that it is ineffective,
are discernible. However, neither argument seems compelling enough to
persuade the ECHR to forgo its traditional practice of providing an extremely
wide margin of appreciation to States in regulating commercial speech.
At first glance, the proposed ban appears to be absolute. It places an
outright prohibition on television commercials designed to attract children
at all times, and during all types of programming. 84 The advertising industry
may argue that this totality renders the ban impermissible under the
Convention.'85 However, this argument perverts the Court's conception of
totality. What would actually be banned is a method of advertising appealing
to children via television. 86 The directive would not completely bar
177. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 390.
178. See Edling, supra note 6.
179. See Green, supra note 3.
180. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 46; see also Berger, supra note 53.
181. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 393.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Industry Divided, supra note 2.
185. See, e.g., Edling, supra note 6.
186. See SWEDISH BROADCASTING LAW, supra note 1.
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advertisers from marketing their products.187 In this way, the ban would be
fundamentally different from the Barcelona Bar Council's ban on lawyer
advertising in Cosado Coca. There, almost any effort to promote a particular
service was prohibited.188 The Court's concern with Mr. Cosado Coca's
ability to advertise at all provides an accurate illustration of what the Court
is concerned about when it considers the totality of a restriction, 89 which is
ensuring that an advertiser has at least some outlet through which to reach the
public.190
Considering that most purchases of goods or services enjoyed by
children under twelve are actually made by adults,191 marketers could not say
that they were prevented from reaching the people who would buy their
products. Nor would the restriction completely prevent marketers from
appealing directly to children. Print campaigns would still be available, as
would point of sale promotions, itself a powerful marketing tool.
192
It would thus be difficult to argue that the proposed ban is a total one
in a sense that would render it disproportionate under Article 10 case law.
Consumers-in this case, parents-would still be aware of the advertisers'
products even through television advertising. 193 Additionally, under the ban
advertisers would maintain unfettered capacity to perpetuate continual
commercial bombardment of children via all mediums except television.' 94
The ECHR has yet to declare any restriction on advertising that has been less
than a total violation of Article 10, and it is highly unlikely that they would
disregard their settled case law to do so in this instance.
95
The second available argument, contending that the availability of
print advertising, point of sale campaigns, marketing tie-ins, and various
other advertising mediums, would render the ban useless because children
would still be exposed to advertising also would likely fail. Any notion that
an interference with free expression must completely insulate society from
the particular harm it seeks to protect against it, lest it be under-inclusive, is
187. See id.
188. See Casado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
189. See id.
190. See Casado Coca, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Rich, supra note 31, at 278.
191. See Hansen, supra note 46.
192. See id.
193. See Edling, supra note 6.
194. See id.
195. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 406.
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misguided.196 In assessing restrictions on Commercial speech all that is
required is evidence that the measure will be effective.197
Television is an extremely potent advertising medium. The audience
is essentially captive, much more so than with print advertising.'98 The
captivating nature of TV is especially appealing to children, who will often
watch whatever is on the screen. 99 Even when a child ignores a television
commercial, it is difficult for them not to receive it peripherally. 2"0 Given the
ubiquity of television in children's lives, a measure preventing certain types
of advertising from being shown on television could not fail to reduce their
overall exposure to advertising.2 1 Because the advertising industry would
be unable to disprove this simple corollary, it could not successfully argue
that the ban is an ineffective method of reducing children's exposure to
advertising. For this reason, any argument that the ban is disproportionate
due to its ineffectiveness would fail.
V. CONCLUSION.
European guarantees of free expression, enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights, clearly articulate the right to unfettered
commercial expression. 0 2 States' efforts to interfere with free expression
must find justification within the text of the Convention itself.2
03
Conventional standards, however, are clearly related to the value of the
expression that State seeks to contain, 0 a and the European Court of Human
196. See, e.g., Handyside v. UK, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). The ECHR's idea of
what is "necessary" is a balancing test-a law does not have to be an indispensable means of
obtaining the legislative aim, nor can it be merely "useful." Id.. See also Olsson v. Sweden,
17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), where the Court elaborated: "According to the Court's
established case-law, the notion of necessity implies that an interference corresponds to a
pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."
Id.
197. See id.; see also, HARRIS, supra note 22, at 406.
198. See Edling, supra note 6.
199. See Hansen, supra note 46.
200. See id.
201. See Edling, supra note 6.
202. See Convention, supra note 5, Art. 10.
203. See id.
204. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 411.
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Rights has consistently downplayed the importance of protecting free
commercial speech, as opposed to other types of expression. °5
As a result, successful legal challenges to State infringements upon
commercial speech based upon Article 10 of the Convention are extremely
rare.206 The Court's unwavering commitment to giving States the widest
margin of appreciation amounts to what can essentially be characterized as
a hands-off policy in the area of commercial speech. 207 The extensive
latitude given to States gains even wider breadth when States act in the
interest of protecting the morality of children.20 8
The wide margin of appreciation the ECHR offers States creates a
legal chasm that the advertising industry cannot hope to negotiate. An EU-
wide ban on children's advertising on television would be founded on a
clearly legitimate Conventional basis, Member States' desires to protect the
morality of their children.20 9 If enacted, the ban would not wholly prevent
marketers from reaching children or their parents through advertising.210
Because the ban would not be a total ban, yet would still be an effective way
of limiting children's exposure to advertising, it would satisfy the ECHR's
requirement that State restrictions on commercial speech be proportionate.211
For these reasons, the advertising industry has little hope of mounting a
successful challenge to the ban, if enacted, based upon Article 10 of the




207. See Rich, supra note 31, at 278.
208. See, e.g., Handyside v. UK, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); see also Muller and
Others v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R.
209. See Edling, supra note 6.
2 10. See Hansen, supra note 46.
211. See Rich, supra note 31, at 278; see also HARRIS, supra note 22, at 390.
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